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Justice Department
I. Introduction
"Beware foreign companies intentionally tampering with the mar-
ket for U.S. exports. We are not going to tolerate it any longer." That
was the message the Department ofJustice attempted to send in United
States v. Pilkington plc and Pilkington Holdings, Inc.' Pilkington was the
first case prosecuted and settled under a 1992 policy change that gave
the Justice Department prosecutorial discretion to challenge anticom-
petitive conduct that occurs outside the United States and that is in-
tended to affect U.S. exporters. The change represents a renewal of
the pre-1988 policy of allowing expansive international antitrust en-
forcement and thus, is a retreat from the 1988 policy change by which
the Department of Justice limited itself to bringing actions only when
U.S. consumers were directly affected.2
Pilkington plc (Pilkington) 3 is an English glassmaker which devel-
oped the first successful float glass method of manufacturing flat
glass. 4 Pilkington quickly entered extensive license agreements with its
principal competitors after its discovery. 5 As float glass processing be-
came the dominant technique, Pilkington gradually gained control of
the market.6 After several years, however, Pilkington's control evolved
into anticompetitive behavior which began to infringe on the rights of
U.S. exporters, thereby provoking this lawsuit. 7
This case is important because it marks the first attempt by the
I "Request for Comments on Draft Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquition of In-
tellectual Property," 59 Fed. Reg. 41,339, at 41,432 (1994).
2 Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 55
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391, at S-3 (Nov. 17, 1988) (hereinafter 1988
Guidelines].
3 Pilkington plc is headquartered in St. Helens, Mereyside, England. Pilkington Hold-
ings, Inc. is a United States subsidiary incorporated in Delaware and based in Toledo, Ohio.
British Glass Manufacturer Settles Case Attacking Restrictions on U.S. Exporters, 66 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1666, at 617 (June 2, 1994) [hereinafter British Glass
Manufacturer].
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Department of Justice to promote free competition in a global econ-
omy that has outgrown the confines of current antitrust law. This Note
will explore the facts and holding of Pilkington in Part II. Part III will
examine the background law, and Part IV will provide an analysis of
the significance of the case. Finally, this Note will conclude that while
Pilkington is a good initial step in fostering unrestrained worldwide
competition, many more are needed to catch up with the rapid evolu-
tion of the international economy.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Background Facts
In order to analyze the alleged anticompetitive conduct of Pilk-
ington, it is first necessary to acquire a basic understanding of the glass
market in which Pilkington operated. Pilkington revolutionized the
flat glass industry8 in the 1950s by designing a commercially feasible
float process.9 This process requires large-scale, single-purpose plants
to manufacture flat glass, the efficiency of which eventually made other
methods of production, such as the plate and sheet processes, virtually
obsolete.10 The cost of a float glass plant typically ranges from $100 to
$150 million dollars. 1 Between 1984 and 1991, fifty-five new float
glass plants were built around the world, and up to fifty more plants
are projected to be constructed before the turn of the century.12
In the early 1960s, Pilkington began entering into patent and
know-how license agreements with all of its major competitors, includ-
ing eight U.S. companies,' 3 in order to maximize the return from its
technological innovation.' 4 At the time of this case, Pilkington con-
trolled over ninety percent of the $15 billion a year' 5 flat glass
market.16
The continued existence of the patent and license agreements was
the center of the legal controversy involving Pilkington. The issuance
of licensing agreements is practically standard procedure for a com-
8 "Flat glass... is used principally for windows in dwellings and commercial buildings,
automobile windshields and other glass parts, architectural products, and mirrors." Id.
9 Id. at 30,609.
10 Id. at 30,608-09. For background information on flat glass manufacturing, including
a description of float, sheet, and plate glass technology, see Franklin E. Williams, Flat Glass
Technology, CONSTRUCTION REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 111(7).
11 Pilkington, 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,608.
12 Id.
13 The U.S. companies were: AFG Industries, Inc.; Combustion Engineering, Inc. (now
AFG); Ford Motor Co.; Fourco Glass Co. (now AFG); Guardian Industries Corp.; Penn-
sylvania Float Glass, Inc. (now Guardian); PPG Industries, Inc.; and Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.
Id. at 30,609.
14 Id.
15 British Glass Manufacturer, supra note 3, at 617.




pany which has created a new commercial technology. 17 These agree-
ments provide the company with a limited monopoly to make
innovation worthwhile, which typically increases the general public
welfare and promotes competition by producing higher quality and/or
lower costgoods and services.' 8 Antitrust issues begin to surface, how-
ever, when the effect of these agreements is no longer to foster compe-
tition.but rather to impede it.19
Pilkington's float license agreements went far beyond that which
was necessary to achieve its productive incentives.2 0 A sampling of the
restrictive provisions contained in the license agreements included:
(1) No right for the licensee to sublicense the technology; (2) Any
disputes were to be settled by arbitration in London under English law;
(3) Territorial and other use limitations imposed on licensees to re-
strict the use of patents and know-how to specified markets; and (4)
Confidentiality and nondisclosure requirements for all disclosed know-
how until the licensee can prove that the know-how is entirely public
knowledge. 21 These restrictive provisions were still in effect despite
the fact that the license agreements themselves and the patents had
expired and the majority of Pilkington's know-how was public
knowledge. 22
B. The Complaint
The Justice Department filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona charging Pilkington with violating sections 1, 2, and
6a of the Sherman Antitrust Act.23 Under the 1992 policy change, the
Justice Department is permitted to:
take antitrust enforcement action against conduct occurring overseas
that restrains United States exports, whether or not there is direct
harm to U.S. consumers, where it is clear that: (1) the conduct has a
direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on exports of
goods or services from the United States; (2) the conduct involves
anti-competitive activities which violate the U.S. antitrust law... ; and
(3) U.S. courts have jurisdiction over foreign persons or corporations
engaged in such conduct.
24
Assessing Pilkington's conduct based on the criteria of the policy
change, the reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. exporters was that
17 Id.
18 Justice Department Seeks Comments on Draft Intellectual Property Guides, 67 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1676, at 18.2 (Aug. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Draft Intellectual Property
Guides].
19 Id.
20 British Glass Manufacturer, supra note 3, at 617.
21 Pilkington plc and Pilkington Holdings, Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 30,604, at 30,609 (Dep't
Justice 1994).
22 Id.
23 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 6a (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
24 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. 92-117, JusTIcE DEPARTMENT WILL CHALLENGE FOR-
EIGN RESTRAINTS ON U.S. ExPoRTs UNDER ANTITRUST LAws 1 (1992) [hereinafter DOJ PRESS
RELEASE).
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they "[could not] design and build new float plants, or sublicense in-
dependent third parties to do so, outside their licensed 'territories'
without Pilkington's permission."25 This restriction reduced existing
competition by limiting the number of competitors in a region.26 It
also decreased the productive incentives that make innovation worth-
while because the opportunities for exploitation were geographically
limited.2 7 The injury to exporters was substantial because without
these restraints, they would be able to compete for design and con-
struction contracts for the projected new plants, which could amount
to increased export sales of up to $2.5 billion over the next several
years.28 The adverse effects were reasonably foreseeable to Pilkington
because it carefully planned and distributed its horizontal restraints29
to achieve worldwide control of the float glass market.30 In addition,
Pilkington strictly enforced this control over U.S. companies through
actual and threatened litigation.31
The Justice Department asserted that this conduct was in violation
of U.S. antitrust laws because the patents and license agreements had
expired, and "the restraints [were] neither ancillary nor reasonably
necessary to any legitimate purpose or transaction, and [were], there-
fore, unreasonable restraints on trade within the meaning of Section 1
of the Sherman Act."32 The Justice Department also asserted that Pilk-
ington used its licensing arrangements to exact a monopoly over the
float glass market, in contravention of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 33
Finally, the Justice Department contended that United States
courts had personal jurisdiction over Pilkington both through its busi-
ness interests and intellectual property rights in the United States and
through its eighty percent ownership of the American glassmaker, Lib-
bey-Owens-Ford Co.34 Personal jurisdiction over Pilkington Holdings,
25 Pilkington, 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,609.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 30,608.
29 Horizontal restraints are arrangements involving "competitors on the same commer-
cial level .. agreeing to prices to be charged or dividing territories or customers." Jean W.
Bums, The New Rol of Coercion in Antitrust, 60 FoRDHwm L. Rv. 379, 381 n.4 (1991). See also
BLACK'S LAW DiarONARY 737 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that horizontal restraints are restraints
among competitors at the same level of distribution).
30 Pil*ington, 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,610.
31 Pilkington brought claims against PPG, Guardian, and AFG in the 1980s. Pilk-
ington's restrictive trade practices largely prevailed in settlements with PPG for violating its
territorial agreement by constructing a glass plant in China and with AFG for not paying
stipulated royalty fees. Guardian, on the other hand, received some concessions in its territo-
rial agreement from Pilkington, involving the disclosure of know-how in building a glass
plant in Luxemborg. Id.
32 Id. at 30,609. See infra text accompanying note 52 for the text of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
33 Pilkington, 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,610. See infra text accompanying note 53 for the text of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
34 Joseph P. Griffin, Recent Cases Show that the Justice Department is Serious About Taking
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a wholly-owned Delaware subsidiary, was obvious.35
C. Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement
The Justice Department entered a proposed final judgment and
competitive impact statement,36 to which Pilkington agreed on May 25,
1994.37 This consent decree provides substantial affirmative and in-
junctive relief intended to remedy the anticompetitive effects of the
restrictive provisions described in the complaint.38 Specifically, the de-
cree eliminates the territorial and use agreements and prohibition on
sublicensing as applied to U.S. licensees.3 9 It creates a safe harbor for
U.S. companies without a Pilkington licensing agreement to use any
float glass technology it currently has without liability to Pilkington. 40
The decree also enjoins conduct that has the "purpose or effect of re-
stricting exports of float glass to the United States or limiting the use
of float technology or manufacture of float glass in North America." 41
Pilkington is not prevented from enforcing the confidentiality of speci-
fied technology if it qualifies as a lawful trade secret, but Pilkington
must disclose the results of the adjudication of its trade secrets to all
interested American companies. 42
D. Reasoning
The settlement using the consent decree has advantages and dis-
advantages for both the Justice Department and Pilkington. A clear
advantage to both sides is the avoidance of the costs, length, and un-
certainties of litigation. 43 The Justice Department accomplished its
goal of giving U.S. exporters the opportunity to take part in the ex-
Action Against Foreign Companies Whose Overseas Conduct Restrains U.S. Exports, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
29, 1994, at Al, B5-B6.
35 Id.
36 The statutory procedure for entering a consent decree by the United States under
the antitrust laws requires filing the judgment with the court and publishing it in the U.S.
Federal Register at least sixty days prior to its effective date. During this interim, public
comments may be submitted to the court regarding the consent decree and any possible
modifications or alternatives. A competitive impact statement is filed and published simulta-
neously explaining the proceeding, anticompetitive conduct, proposed judgment, remedies
available to private plaintiffs, procedures for modification of the judgment, and any alterna-
tives considered. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a)-(b) (1988).
The Justice Department received three comments during the interim period but did not
make any significant changes to the proposed judgment, according to its October 19, 1994
publication. Pilkington plc and Pilkington Holdings, Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 52,823 (Dep'tJustice
1994) (response of the United States to public comments concerning proposed final
judgment).
37 Pilkington plc and Pilkington Holdings, Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 30,604 (Dep't Justice
1994).




42 Id. at 30,606-07.
43 Id. at 30,612; Griffin, supra note 34, at B6.
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panding international float glass market. According to United States
Attorney General Janet Reno, the consent decree "will open new mar-
kets abroad for American businesses exporting high-tech services, and
thereby create additional well-paying jobs for highly-skilled American
workers and professionals here at home."44 The increased competi-
tion should also "result in improved glass processes at lower prices."45
Pilkington, on the other hand, felt that the decree was fair in that it
protected its technological innovation and applied only to the U.S.
glass industry. 46 Apparently Pilkington does not believe the consent
decree will substantially affect its current conduct and does not plan to
abide by it, according to Pilkington's attorney, Bob Schlossberg.47 Pilk-
ington also guarded itself against private lawsuits because a consent
decree is not admissible as evidence in other actions and does not
serve as prima facie evidence of a violation. 48
It appears that the two sides do not have identical views regarding
the application of the final judgment, which maybe due to the vague
wording in the agreement, and more litigation might become neces-
sary in the future. 49 In any event, the settlement of this case "demon-
strates the [Justice] Department's determination to use its antitrust
enforcement powers in appropriate circumstances to preserve the, abil-
ity of American enterprises to compete on fair terms in international
markets for U.S. export business." 50
III. Background Law
A. The Sherman Act
In charting the history of antitrust enforcement to assess the im-
pact of Pilkington, the natural starting point is the Sherman Antitrust
Act5' which was first adopted in 1890. Section one, dealing with trusts,
states that "[e]very... restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 52 Likewise,
Section two, regarding monopolies, states that "[e]very person who
shall monopolize . . .any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a fel-
44 British Glass Manufacturer, supra note 3, at 617-18 (quoting Attorney General Janet
Reno).
45 Pilkington, 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,612.
46 Footnote 159 Case Brings Uncertain Results, 4 DOJ ALERT, No. 11, June 20, 1994, at 1, 8
[hereinafter Footnote 159 Case].
47 Id.
48 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 411 (6th ed. 1990). This consent decree will have no
affect on the PPG's current suit against Pilkington, which also concerns the restrictive licens-
ing agreements, according to Tom Barr, attorney for PPG. Footnote 159 Case, supra note 46, at
8.
49 Footnote 159 Case, supra note 46, at 8.
50 British Glass Manufacturer, supra note 3, at 618 (quoting Attorney General Janet
Reno).
51 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
52 Id. § I (emphasis added).
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ony."5 3 In light of the language chosen, it definitely appears that Con-
gress intended international enforcement. 54 In 1944, the United
States Supreme Court declared that "Congress wanted to go to the ut-
most extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monop-
oly agreements."55 One year later in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (ALCOA),5 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that U.S. laws may apply to any conduct outside the
United States that has an intended effect on U.S. commerce. 57
Notwithstanding these holdings, the jurisdictional reach of the Sher-
man Act still was still uncertain.58
B. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
To clarify this lingering uncertainty, Congress passed the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) in 1982.59 The relevant
portion of the FTAIA states that the Sherman Act only applies to trade
or commerce with foreign nations that has "a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect... on export trade or export commerce
with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce
in the United States."60 This Act sets up a more structured test for
determining whether the Sherman Act was intended to apply to the
conduct in question. The burden is placed on the plaintiff to prove
that the challenged conduct affected U.S. export opportunities to the
degree specified by the statute and that the exporter's own opportuni-
ties were affected to that degree. 61 Once these requirements are met,
the court has the discretion to examine the international nature of the
case to determine whether to entertain litigation.62
C. 1977 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations
Prior to the clarification provided by the FTAIA, the Justice De-
partment expressed its position regarding international enforcement
in the 1977 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Opera-
53 Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
54 Joseph P. Griffin, New U.S. Enforcement Policy is Assessed, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1992, at 1,
23.
55 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944).
56 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
57 Id. at 443. See generally Lori B. Morgan & Helaine S. Rosenbaum, U.S. Department of
Justice Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 34 HARv. INT'L LJ. 192, 198 (1993) (discussing the use of
the Sherman Act to impose liability for events that occurred outside the United States).
58 See, e.g., Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 194 (discussing a variety of court
decisions after the passage of the Sherman Act which tried to reconcile its jurisdictional
reach).
59 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988).
60 Id. § 6a(1)(B).
61 Griffin, supra note 54, at 23.
62 Id. For further information concerning the discretion of the court, see infra notes
106-10 and accompanying text.
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tions (1977 Guidelines).63 The international enforcement policy of
the guidelines consisted of two major purposes:
The first [purpose] is to protect the American consuming public
by assuring it the benefit of competitive products and ideas produced
by foreign competitors as well as domestic competitors ....
The second... purpose is to protect American export and invest-
ment opportunities against privately imposed restrictions. The con-
cern is that each U.S.-based firm engaged in the export of goods,
services, or capital should be allowed to compete on the merits and
not be shut out by some restriction imposed by a bigger or less princi-
pled competitor.
64
This statement conveyed a very proactive stance toward U.S. antitrust
enforcement overseas. 65 When the FTAIA was passed five years later,
the avenue for the Department of Justice to bring international anti-
trust actions seemed to be paved. 66
The reinforced approach was exhibited in two cases decided in
1982. In United States v. C. Itoh &. Co., eightJapanese corporations were
charged by the Department of Justice with fixing the prices paid to
Alaskan crab processors. 67 A consent decree settled the case and
"barred the defendants from exchanging information or agreeing on
prices, offers, strategy or quantity of purchases from any U.S. person
for ten years."68 Japanese corporations were also defendants in a pri-
vate antitrust action under the Sherman Act. The case of Daishowa In-
ternational v. North Coast Export Co., was initiated when a Japanese
buyer's cartel boycotted a U.S. exporter of wood chips who had re-
fused to accept the cartel's purchase conditions. 69 The court found
that jurisdiction existed and prohibited the continuance of the boy-
cott. 70 These cases seemed to create a solid foundation for future in-
ternational antitrust enforcement. 71
D. 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations
The foundation established for international antitrust enforce-
ment was uprooted in 1988 with the introduction of the 1988 Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1988 Guide-
lines). 72 Specifically, the infamous "footnote 159" in the 1988 Guide-
lines stated that the Justice Department will only enforce U.S. antitrust
63 Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations,
Uan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (Feb. 1, 1977).
64 Id. at E-2.
65 See Griffin, supra note 54, at 23.
66 Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 194-95.
67 1982-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,010 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
" Griffin, supra note 54, at 25.
69 1982-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,774 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
70 Id.
71 Griffin, supra note 34, at B5.
72 1988 Guidelines, supra note 2.
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laws abroad if overseas conduct that restrains U.S. exports directly
"harm [s] U.S. consumers by reducing output or raising prices."73 This
substantially limited the prosecutorial discretion that the Justice De-
partment had enjoyed under the FTAIA and the 1977 Guidelines 74
and was consistent with the minimal government regulation advocated
by the Reagan and Bush administrations. 75 The 1988 Guidelines fo-
cused solely on the consumer welfare concerns as recited in the first
prong of the 1977 Guidelines 76 while completely ignoring the interests
of U.S. exporters, whose interests were protected in the 1977 Guide-
lines' second stated purpose 77 and by the Sherman Act under the
FTAIA.78 The revised guidelines were apparently intended both to re-
spond to recent developments in the law and changes in legal reason-
ing79 and to eliminate uncertainty in antitrust enforcement policy.8 0
The 1988 Guidelines, however, only made antitrust enforcement more
unclear.8 1
E. 1992 Department of Justice Policy Statement
On April 3, 1992, the latest turn in this continuing saga occurred
when the Department ofJustice announced it had once again changed
its mind regarding international antitrust enforcement.82 A press re-
lease stated that U.S. antitrust enforcement laws now are to encompass
foreign business activity that has an anticompetitive effect on U.S. ex-
porters, notwithstanding the fact that U.S. consumers are not adversely
affected.83 This change renewed the prosecutorial discretion the De-
partment of Justice was intended to have under the FTAIA 84 and
opened the door for the proceeding against Pilkington. The new crite-
ria for foreign conduct to be subject to an antitrust action8 5 is, not
surprisingly, very similar to the guidelines of the FTAIA.8 6 The press
73 Id. at S-21 n.59.
74 British Glass Manufacturer, supra note 3, at 617. See supra notes 59-71 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of the FTAIA and the 1977 Guidelines.
75 Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 195 n.19.
76 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
77 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
78 Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 195.
79 The changes in legal reasoning were evidently in furtherance of a policy of minimal
government interference supported by the Reagan and Bush administrations. Justice Depart-
ment Releases Updated International Guide, 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391, at
890 (Nov. 17, 1988).
80 The uncertainty can be attributed to the Justice Department's failure to pursue inter-
national antitrust enforcement, despite its documented ability to do so. Id.
81 This policy change was perplexing because of its contradiction with the FTAIA and
previous Supreme Court decisions. It left the status of the FTAIA and private antitrust liti-
gants in a state of limbo. Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 193.
82 See DOJ PREss RELEASE, supra note 24, at 1.
83 Id.
84 Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 192, 194.
85 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
86 Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 194-95. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988) (delineat-
ing the FTAIA guidelines.)
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release also reported that international comity, which is "the notion
that foreign nations are due deference when acting within their legiti-
mate spheres of authority,"8 7 will continue to be observed. In addi-
tion, if the conduct occurs in a foreign country, the Justice
Department is to notify and consult with that country and is to be "pre-
pared to work with that country, if that country is better situated to
remedy the conduct and is prepared to take action against such con-
duct, pursuant to its antitrust laws."88
The switch from minimal government interference to active inter-
national antitrust enforcement, however, does not give the Depart-
ment of justice a free reign to prosecute at will.89 For those fearful of
foreign policy debacles, several safeguards still exist to limit the discre-
tion of the Justice Department in deciding when to act.90 The Depart-
ment of Justice must first assess the reasonableness of the prosecution
by examining international comity and any conflicts with the laws of
the foreign nation in which the conduct occurred. 91 The 1988 Guide-
lines devised a balancing test of competing national interests to struc-
ture the Department's analysis in making this assessment. This
balancing test considers:
(1) the relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct within
the United States as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the
conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States con-
sumers or competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the con-
duct on the United States as compared to the effects abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered
or defeated by the action; and
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign eco-
nomic policies. 92
Finally, the Justice Department will examine any potential conflicts
with U.S. foreign policy in bringing the action. This examination is to
involve consultations with other agencies in the executive branch of
the U.S. government, including the United States Trade Representa-
tive and the State Department.9 3 If an antitrust suit appears to be un-
87 1988 Guidelines, supra note 2, at S-22. For more background on international comity
issues, including an analysis of the effect of Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 113 S.
Ct. 2891 (1993), see Scott A. Burr, The Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to Foreign Conduct: Has
Hartford Fire Extinguished Considerations of Comity, 15 U. PA. J. Ir'L Bus. L. 221 (1994).
88 DOJ PRESS RELEASE, supra note 24, at 1.
89 Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 192, 196.
90 Id. at 197-201.
91 Id. at 197.
92 1988 Guidelines, supra note 2, at S-22 n.170. This test was included in the 1988 Guide-
lines to evaluate international actions based on conduct which has a direct effect on U.S.
consumers, but it still applies to actions resulting from conduct which only harms U.S. ex-
porters, as allowed in the 1992 policy change. Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 197.
93 Griffin, supra note 54, at 27.
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fair or unproductive, diplomatic agreements may be pursued in lieu of
legal action.94
The screening process, however, is not completed when the suit is
filed. It is then the judiciary's turn to review the prosecutorial discre-
tion of the Justice Department through a jurisdictional analysis, which
requires personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and pre-
scriptive jurisdiction to entertain the suit.95
Personal jurisdiction requires the defendant to have "minimum
contacts" with the judicial forum so that the suit does not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice," according to the
Supreme Court.96 The general principles have been supplemented
and clarified -by several other decisions to produce a workable stan-
dard, which involves balancing the burden on the defendant, the inter-
ests of the judicial district, and the plaintiff's need for relief in
adjudicating the matter.97 The Supreme Court further noted in Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court that the "procedural and substantive
policies of other nations whose interests are affected" must be consid-
ered before deciding to allow the suit to continue. 98
In U.S. antitrust actions involving foreign defendants, prescriptive
jurisdiction, which "deals with the power of a state to prescribe [con-
duct,]" 99 and subject matterjurisdiction, which "concerns the power of
a court to hear a category of disputes[,]" 100 are usually evaluated to-
gether because a congressional grant of prescriptive jurisdiction is ac-
companied by a simultaneous grant of subject matter jurisdiction to
the federal courts.101 The FTAIA 10 2 was meant to elucidate the stan-
dard for granting subject matter and prescriptive jurisdiction.103 The
doctrine of the FTAIA was recently reinforced by the Supreme Court's
decision in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,10 4 in which the
Court held that "U.S. antitrust laws apply to conduct by non-U.S. citi-
zens that occurred outside the United States and that was intended to,
and did, produce a substantial effect in the United States-even if the
94 Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 197.
95 Id. at 198-99.
- 96 International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
97 See PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS 235c (1978) (discussing the general principles of per-
sonal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in connection with the Sherman Act).
98 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
99 GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED
STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 404 (1989).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 404 n.5.
102 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
103 See Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
104 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993). The dissent feared the position taken in the majority opin-
ion, calling it a "breathtakingly broad proposition ... that will bring the Sherman Act and
other laws into sharp and unnecessary conflict with the legitimate interests of other countries
- particularly our closest trading partners." Id. at 2922 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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conduct was lawful where it occurred." 10 5 The court also has some
discretion regarding the application of the U.S. antitrust laws and in-
ternational comity issues.'0 6 It may examine the 'Jurisdictional rule of
reason,"10 7 which is a judicial equivalent to the balancing test recited
by the justice Department in its 1988 Guidelines, 08 and other applica-
ble principles before proceeding with the lawsuit.' 0 9 The Justice De-
partment still has the burden to prove that a violation of the antitrust
laws occurred and that the requisite injury resulted before the suit will
proceed. 110
III. Significance of Pilkington
A. Enforcement of International Antitrust Activities
Now that the stage has been set, the wide array of effects from the
Pilkington case can be evaluated. The most obvious and probably most
important effect is the position of active international antitrust en-
forcement reflected by the suit.' "The current policy will extend the
Department ofJustice's antitrust enforcement to the full reach ofjuris-
diction granted by Congress in the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act." 1 2 This appears to be more in line with the
Congressional intent underlying the enactment of the FTAIA." 3 U.S.
exporters may now enjoy the protection promised to them under the
Sherman Act and under the purposes of international antitrust en-
forcement set forth by the Department of Justice in its 1977 Guide-
lines, which should help boost exports and reduce the existing trade
105 Griffin, supra note 34, at B5.
106 Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 197-201.
107 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 749 F.2d 1378, 1381-86 (9th Cir. 1984).
The factors of the jurisdictional rule of reason test were summarized in Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979), as: 1) degree of foreign con-
flict; 2) nationality of parties; 3) relative importance of violation here and abroad; 4) availa-
bility of foreign litigation and remedy; 5) intent to and foreseeability of harm to U.S.
commerce; 6) effect of foreign relations on litigation; 7) international comity; 8) power of
U.S. court to enforce judgment; 9) acceptability of potential foreign judgment; and 10) exist-
ence of treaty addressing the issue.
108 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
109 Other applicable doctrines may include the act of state doctrine and the doctrine of
foreign compulsion. Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 200-01. The act of state doc-
trine reflects the principle that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See also BLACK'S LAw DICroNARY 34 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that the
doctrine "precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of governmen-
tal acts of a recognized foreign sovereign committed within its own territory."). The doctrine
of foreign compulsion is a corollary of the act of state doctrine which states that "certain U.S.
laws will not be applied extraterritorially to conduct that was required by foreign states."
BORN & WESTIN, supra note 99, at 466 (emphasis omitted).
110 See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988).
111 See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 34, at B5-B6.
112 Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 194.
113 Id. at 194-95.
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deficit.1 14 It also signals the U.S. government's frustration with the
lack of progress resulting from less confrontational methods intended
to increase competition, such as traditional trade negotiations. 15
The question then arises whether this action is merely a symbolic
gesture by the Department of Justice to exhibit its newly defined pow-
ers or whether it is only the first of many actions to increase global
competition.1 16 Only time will answer this question fully, but it is en-
couraging that the Justice Department has settled two additional cases
since Pilkington.
In United States v. MCI Communications Corp., a consent decree that
required extensive public disclosure and fairness provisions was en-
tered to limit the potential anticompetitive effects that could arise
from British Telecommunications' purchase of twenty percent of MCI
and the creation of a vertically integrated joint venture between the
two corporations.' 17 On July 15, 1994, another consent decree was
used to settle United States v. Microsoft, Inc." 8 In this case, the Justice
Department and the European Commission were suspicious of the
software licensing techniques of Microsoft. 119 The settlement forced
Microsoft to disclose confidential information regarding its licensing
practices and to allow the Justice Department and European Commis-
sion to share this confidential information with each other.120
It should be noted that all three of these recent cases involved
enforcement in countries that are among the United States closest
trading partners, which means that no one is immune from the scope
of U.S. antitrust laws. 12 1 Unfortunately, it may also signify that these
are the only places that the Justice Department felt it could obtain ju-
risdiction and the necessary evidence to prosecute.1 2 2
Pilkington and the aggressive enforcement policy it represents may
also have substantial negative implications.' 23 One commentator has
stated that "[t]he diplomatic costs of the renewed enforcement policy
114 Id. at 194.
115 Id. at 202.
116 British Glass Manufacturer, supra note 3, at 617.
117 59 Fed. Reg. 33,009 (Dep'tJustice 1994) (proposed final judgment and competitive
impact statement).
118 59 Fed. Reg. 42,845 (Dep'tJustice 1994) (proposed final judgment and competitive
impact statement).
119 Griffin, supra note 34, at B6. Microsoft's licensing techniques with manufacturers
apparently created anticompetitive effects due to their unreasonable length, royalty charges,
exclusionary requirements, and nondisclosure agreements. Microsoft, 59 Fed. Reg. at 42,845-
46.
120 Griffin, supra note 34, at B6.
121 British Glass Manufacturer, supra note 3, at 617.
122 For a further discussion of this problem and possible answers, see infta notes 143-83
and accompanying text. Metzenbaum and Brooks Will Offer Bill to Expand DOJ Power on Overseas
Documents, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1668, at 672 (June 16, 1994) [hereinaf-
ter Mettenbaum and Brooks].
123 Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 202.
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may outweigh the domestic benefits."12 4 Foreign nations are often of-
fended by aggressive antitrust action taken by the United States within
their national boundaries and prefer that trade agreements and nego-
tiations be used instead.125 This resentment may subject U.S. compa-
nies to retaliatory action from other countries and may damage the
position of the United States in other trade agreements and negotia-
tions.' 26 Also, several countries have enacted statutes to hinder the
United States from bringing foreign antitrust actions. 127 For example,
"blocking" statutes, which limit the foreign information available for
discovery by the United States, and "clawback" statutes, which allow
foreign companies to recoup their antitrust damages paid to a U.S.
private plaintiff, are on the books in countries such as Canada, the
United Kingdom, and Australia.128 Furthermore, the aggressive pos-
ture displayed by the Department of Justice may encourage private in-
dividuals to bring more international antitrust actions.129 These
private suits have a large potential to injure U.S. foreign relations be-
cause private plaintiffs "often are unwilling to exercise the degree of
self-restraint and consideration of foreign governmental sensitivities
that is exercised by the U.S. government."13 0
B. Japanese Influence
Another significant aspect of Pilkington is its relation to trade prac-
tices in Japan. Both the 1992 policy change and the settlement of Pilk-
ington have sparked much debate about the role of Japan in the
current chain of events, although Japan has not been directly involved
yet.' 3 ' Many interested observers, including the Japanese government,
believe that the policy change was aimed directly atJapan, despite the
language of the policy stating it was of "general application." 3 2 This
inference most likely stems from the initial reconsideration of the 1988
policy, which was announced during a press conference regarding the
progress of the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) 13 3 with the Jap-
124 Id. at 203.
125 Id. at 202.
126 Id. at 203.
127 Id.
128 Id. Examples of these statutes are the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, ch. 49,
1954 S.C. 1863 (Can.); Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (Eng.); Foreign
Proceedings (Prohibtion of Certain Evidence) Act, Act No. 121, 1976 Austl. Acts 121; and
Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, Act No. 13, 1979 Austl. Acts
13. For a more detailed discussion of thereasons behind and the effects of these statutes,
using the British Protection of Trading Interests Act as the focus, see Tina J. Kahn, Com-
ment, The Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980: Britain's Response to U.S. Extratenitorial
Antitrust Enforcement, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 476 (1980).
129 Griffin, supra note 54, at 27.
130 Id.
131 Griffin, supra note 34, at B6.
132 Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 195, 203-04.
133 The SII consists of continuing negotiations between the United States and Japan to
overcome non-tariff trade barriers. Id. at 195.
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anese government.1 3 4 Reconsideration of the 1988 policy gained sup-
port when the Japanese keiretsu system of vertical integration, 135
which virtually shuts out U.S. exporters from the Japanese auto supply
parts market, was publicly exposed.' 3 6 Japan has countered by saying
that the policy change undermines the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).' 3 7 Also, Masaru Matsuo, spokesperson for the Jap-
anese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), labeled the change as "contrary
to basic principles of international jurisdiction."'13 8 This scenario be-
comes more interesting when factoring in the recent charges from
U.S. glassmakers alleging thatJapanese glassmakers have blocked their
entry into the $4.5 billion Japanese glass market.139 These charges
lend credence to the notion that Pilkington was brought both to serve
as a warning to the Japanese that the U.S. position on international
enforcement is firm and to encourage the JFTC to enforce its ownan-
ticompetition laws.' 40 The ploy is working to some extent because the
JFTC has charged three companies with antitrust violations since the
policy reconsideration was divulged in 1990, whereas it had brought
-such charges only once in the preceding twenty years. 141 It seems that
the true impact of this new policy will not be felt until-it is enforced
against a Japanese company, assuming that such enforcement ever
occurs. 1
4 2
C. Coordination of International Antitrust Enforcement Agencies
The revision of the antitrust guidelines and the Pilkington
case have made it clear that international antitrust enforcement is
the desired method by the United States at this point in time to
respond to the competition problems present in the global econo-
my.143 This method will not be effective, however, if the antitrust
enforcement agencies cannot get the documents or witnesses neces-
sary to prosecute the offender. 144 The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
134 Id.
135 "Keiretsu is a system of close cooperation between component suppliers and manu-
facturers and distributors. Allegedly, keiretsu makes it difficult for U.S. firms seeking access
to Japanese markets to find suppliers, distributors and customers." Griffin, supra note 34, at
B6.
136 Griffin, supra note 54, at 26.
137 British Glass Manufacturer, supra note 3, at 617.
138 Catherine Yang, Commerce Cops, Bus. WK, Dec. 13, 1993, at 1, 69.
139 Id. The Japanese glassmakers accused are Asahi Glass, Nippon Sheet Glass, and Cen-
tral Glass. The charge is that there appears to be some form of collusion occurring because
these companies have maintained their same market shares since World War II. Id.
140 Id. at 70.
141 Id.
142 See id.
143 Senate Panel Explores Cooperation with Foreign Antitrust Authorities, 67 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1676, at 201 (Aug. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Senate Panel].
144 See, e.g., id. ("Metzenbaum ... said that the legislation is needed because price-fixing
cartels operate from abroad and United States enforcement agencies need to obtain informa-
tion from foreign officers to prosecute these foreign cartels.").
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dure145 permit service of process in foreign countries, but the Depart-
ment of Justice often depends upon voluntary cooperation and docu-
ments located in the United States to minimize the chances of an
international conflict. 146 According to one deputy attorney general,
'[v]ery substantial difficulties may exist in collecting evidence within
the jurisdiction of a foreign country which may be unmotivated or
even hostile toward collection of such evidence." 147 The implementa-
tion of blocking statutes only worsens the situation. 14
To make the new policy successful, the Justice Department's tools
of enforcement must stay in step with the internationalization of the
market.149 Coordination and cooperation between nations are re-
quired to execute antitrust enforcement activities. 150 Since the United
States is not alone in the fight against anticompetitive conduct, other
countries should be willing to agree to assist each other and share the
necessary information.' 5 '
The United States has already entered into two such agreements
that are worthy of note. 52 The first is the European Communities-
United States Agreement Regarding the Application of Competition
Laws. 153 This Agreement was adopted in 1991 to increase the consis-
tency of antitrust analyses and to reduce intergovernmental conflicts
through provisions for notification, information sharing, coordination
of enforcement activities, and the avoidance of conflicts.' 54 It also in-
cludes a special section entitled "positive comity," which allows one na-
tion affected by anticompetitive conduct in the other nation to request
the other nation to initiate enforcement proceedings.' 55 The results
so far have included more efficient and accurate antitrust investiga-
tions and heightened awareness by potential violators, despite some
problems with the procedural validity of the agreement. 156 Although
145 FED. R. Cirv. P. 4(f), (h). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1312(d)(2) (1988) (authorizing foreign
service of process pursuant to antitrust civil process).
146 Griffin, supra note 54, at 25.
147 See Paul Bluestein, Japanese Spurn Plan to Break Up Cartels, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1992,
at Dl, col. 5.
148 Griffin, supra note 54, at 23.
149 Metzenbaum and Brooks, supra note 122, at 671.
150 Joseph P. Griffin, E.G. - U.S. Agreement on Antitrust Already has had Impact on Business,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 13, 1992, at 1; 31.
151 Id. at 31.
152 Griffin, supra note 34, at B6 n.26. Other agreements include the Agreement Relating
to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters,June 29, 1982, U.S.-Austl., 21 I.L.M. 702, and the Agree-
ment Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23,
1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 15 I.L.M. 1282. See Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 196 n.26.
153 Agreement Regarding the Application of Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-
E.C., 30 I.L.M 1487.
154 Id. at arts. I-VI, 30 I.L.M. at 1492-1500.
155 Id. at art. V, 30 I.L.M. at 1497-98.
156 The French government is challenging the validity of the Agreement because it was
never ratified by the European Communities Council of Ministers. The French do not op-




not specifically geared toward antitrust enforcement, the Canada-
United States Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters,157 negotiated in 1985, is a similar arrangement except that it deals
only with criminal investigations. 158 It facilitates the reciprocal flow of
information between the two nations to assist in investigations and
prosecutions, and it was recently successfully employed in the settle-
ment of an international antitrust case.159 These agreements are steps
in the right direction, but more are needed to allow complete global
antitrust enforcement. 160
Congress is attempting to do its part to encourage international
antitrust enforcement. 16' The International Antitrust Enforcement
Assistance Act of 1994 (IAEAA) is a bipartisan bill on the floor in both
the House of Representatives 162 and the Senate.' 63 This Bill would al-
low the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) to enter into bilateral agreements with other antitrust agencies
in foreign countries to permit information sharing and assistance in
antitrust investigations. 164 The Bill is modeled after the 1988 stat-
utes165 that allowed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
negotiate mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) with foreign securi-
ties regulators in order to successfully deal with the internalization of
securities trading.' 66
Once the MLATs are in place, antitrust agencies will be able to
request assistance from foreign agencies in exchange for the promise
of reciprocal assistance, but cooperation is not mandatory. 167 In order
to implement the IAEAA, certain U.S. policies, such as the Antitrust
Civil Process Act,' 68 grand jury secrecy rules,' 69 and the FTC Act, 170
will have to be amended to allow the United States legally to partici-
157 Canda-United States: Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar.
18, 1985, U.S.-Can., 24 I.L.M. 1092.
158 Griffin, supra note 34, at B6 n.26.
159 The case involved was United States v. Kanzaki Specialty Papers, Inc., 6 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 1 45 (D. Mass. 1994) (Case No. 4086). Griffin, supra note 34, at B6 n.26.
160 Metzenbaum and Brooks, supra note 122, at 671.
161 Id.
162 H.R. 4781, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The Bill was introduced to the House of
Representatives by Representatives Jack Brooks (D-Tex.) and Hamilton Fish (R-N.Y.). House
Subcommittee Considers Bill for Reciprocal Antitrust Enforcement, 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1676, at 202 (Aug. 11, 1994) [hereinafter House Subcommittee].
163 S. 2297, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2-11 (1994). Senators Howard Metzenbaum (D-
Ohio) and Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) introduced the Bill to the Senate. Senate Panel, supra
note 143, at 201.
164 House Subcommittee, supra note 162, at 202-03.
165 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 21(a)(2), 24(c), 24(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a),
78x(c), 78x(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
166 Metzenbaum and Brooks, supra note 122, at 672.
167 Houe Subcommittee, supra note 162, at 202-03.
168 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988).
169 28 U.S.C. § 1866 (1988).
170 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1988).
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pate in the information sharing. 171 Extensive safeguards are included
in the Act to protect the shared confidential information from abuses
that include the misappropriation, by foreign antitrust agencies, of the
information to foreign competitors.' 72 For example, the foreign anti-
trust authority must "[h]ave confidentiality laws similar to our own and
pledge to comply with those laws, [r]eturn all exchanged information
to the U.S., and [t]ake immediate and effective action if there is a
leak."173 In addition, the MLAT will be immediately canceled if its
power is misused.1 74 There is still some concern with the safety of con-
fidential information because companies will not be notified when
their information is being shared and will have no judicial opportunity
to oppose information sharing beforehand.1 75 On the whole, how-
ever, the IAEAA "represents a carefully prepared mechanism that will
allow [the United States] to get the evidence we need to enforce our
antitrust laws in today's global economy, while safeguarding sensitive
business information against misuse and improper disclosure," accord-
iig to Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman. 176
In addition to individual agreements between countries, a few at-
tempts to create an international code have been proposed to achieve
the coordination and cooperation necessary for international antitrust
enforcement.1 77 An International Antitrust Code 78 was presented in
1993 that "seeks to establish minimum substantive standards for na-
tional antitrust laws."1 79 The Code would act as a supplement to GATT
and. would create an agency to oversee the enforcement of the Code
and a panel to resolve any disputes.180 Although an admirable idea,
the general consensus is that international antitrust codes, such as this
one, are not economically and politically feasible due to the wide dif-
ferences among nations.181 A more practicable alternative may be
"[t] he negotiation of a set of competition principles at the GATT and a
'side agreement' open to all GATT members that would set out a com-
mon understanding with regard to conflicts in competition policy that
might cause trade friction or hinder free trade." 8 2 Whatever the
means, the coordination of international antitrust agencies is impera-
171 House Subcommittee, supra note 162, at 202.
172 Senate Pane supra note 143, at 201.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 House Subcommittee, supra note 162, at 202-03.
176 Senate Panel, supra note 143, at 201.
177 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The
Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393, 424 (1994).
178 Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO Plurilateral Trade Agreement,
July 10, 1993, reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at S-9 to S-22 (Aug.
19, 1993) (Special Supplement).
179 Schoenbaum, supra note 177, at 425.
180 Id. at 426.
181 Id. at 427.
182 Id. at 424.
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tive to maintaining the aggressive stance on antitrust enforcement rep-
resented in Pilkington.18 3
D. , Intellectual Property Rights
Along with its significance as the first case under the 1992 Depart-
ment of Justice policy change, Pilkington also has important implica-
tions in the area of antitrust enforcement of intellectual property
rights. 184 Pilkington is the first monopolization charge in an intellec-
tual property rights case and only the second case18 5 brought under
section two of the Sherman Act1 86 since the 1970s.187 It represents the
continuation of the Department's recent focus on the abuses of intel-
lectual property rights.188 There has been much concern expressed
over the broad use of intellectual property rights and its anticompeti-
tive effects.' 89 The Department ofJustice' has responded both by sepa-
rating product markets from "innovation markets,"190 which are
theoretical markets for new technology, 191 and by drafting new intel-
lectual property guides to replace portions of the 1988 Antitrust En-
forcement Guidelines for International Operations.1 92
V. Conclusion
There is no doubt that the prosecution and settlement of the Pilk-
ington case is an important occurrence. But, the extent of its signifi-
cance is yet to be to determined. It was definitely a boon for U.S. glass
manufacturers, who now have the opportunity to obtain a larger share
of the growing worldwide glass market. It also exhibited the Depart-
ment ofJustice's ability to enforce U.S. antitrust laws in a foreign coun-
try to promote free competition. Intolerance of intellectual property
rights abuses and monopolies was represented as well.
Besides these immediate results, there are still many unresolved
questions that will not be'answered until future events take place. Will
183 See Metzenbaum and Brooks, supra note 122, at 672.
184 Footnote 159 Case, supra note 46, at 9.
185 The first case was United States v. Electronic Payment Servs., Inc., 59 Fed. Reg.
24,711 (D. Del. 1994). See Footnote 159 Case, supra note 46, at 8.
186 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
187 Footnote 159 Case, supra note 46, at 9.
188 Griffin, supra note 34, at B5.
189 Id. at B6. Intellectual property rights have been the topic of several talks given by the
Justice Department warning that these rights are not unlimited and that they will be closely
scrutinized in the future. Footnote 159, supra note 46, at 9.
190 "Request for Comments on Draft Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of
Intellectual Property," 59 Fed. Reg. 41,339, at 41,432 (1994). See Footnote 159 Case, supra note
46, at 9.
191 Footnote 159 Case, supra note 46, at 9.
192 Draft Intellectual Property Guides, supra note 18, at 182. The innovation market chal-
lenged in Pilkington was glass plant know-how. Footnote 159 Case, supra note 46, at 9. The MCI
and Microsoft cases also involved intellectual property rights abuses. Griffin, supra note 34, at
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Pilkington and the other cases recently settled by the Justice Depart-
ment merely serve as symbols designed to influence future trade nego-
tiations and encourage other countries to enforce more strictly their
own antitrust laws? It should not be overlooked that under the 1977
Guidelines and the FTAIA, only one case, United States v. C. Itoh &
Co.,193 was ever prosecuted by the Department of Justice. Will the Jus-
tice Department ever try to enforce U.S. antitrust laws beyond the
friendly borders of its closest allies by venturing into countries such as
Japan, where antitrust enforcement is probably more needed? Will the
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act become a success-
ful tool to facilitate antitrust enforcement or will it fail to achieve the
required coordination and cooperation? Will the world recognize the
existing competition problems and devise comprehensive interna-
tional agreements to rectify them? Will the "innovation markets' con-
cept prove to be the key to halting the improprieties in intellectual
property rights?
Unfortunately, no one has a crystal ball so as to predict accurately
the future course of events. Even though there is the possibility that
Pilkington may not provide the specific solution to the problem of in-
ternational antitrust enforcement, it is a successful case because it at
least puts these questions into focus. It is now left to the future to
provide the answers.
DAVID A. HARMis
193 1982-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,010 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
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